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In Gilligan and Krehbiel’s models of procedural choice in legislatures, a committee exerts costly effort to acquire private
information about an unknown state of the world. Subsequent work on expertise, delegation, and lobbying has largely
followed this approach. In contrast, we develop a model of information as policy valence. We use our model to analyze a
procedural choice game, focusing on the effect of transferability, i.e., the extent to which information acquired to implement
one policy option can be used to implement a different policy option. We find that when information is transferable, as
in Gilligan and Krehbiel’s models, closed rules can induce committee specialization. However, when information is policy-
specific, open rules are actually superior for inducing specialization. The reason for this surprising result is that a committee
lacking formal agenda power has a greater incentive to exercise informal agenda power by exerting costly effort to generate
high-valence legislation.
T
he formal study of legislative organization was
revolutionized in a series of papers byGilligan and
Krehbiel, starting with their classic 1987 paper on
procedural choice. In a sharp break from the previously
prevailing norm in the literature, in which committees
were modeled as a means for distributing particularistic
legislative spoils, Gilligan and Krehbiel developedmodels
in which the congressional committee system is primarily
a division-of-labor arrangement facilitating the produc-
tionofhigh-quality legislation. In themodels, committees
are delegated the task of acquiring policy expertise for a
parent chamber that cares about both ideological pol-
icy outcomes and the production of good public policy
(Fenno 1973).
Gilligan and Krehbiel’s models feature a hold-up
problem based on Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) canonical
analysis of cheap talk. A committee can invest in a costly
public good—information—that enhances the quality of
its recommended legislation. However, once produced,
information can be expropriated by other legislators to
achieve their own, potentially quite different, policy goals.
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1 High-profile examples from the literatures on lobbying and legislative politics include Austen-Smith (1990), Baron (2000), and Battaglini
(2000). Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) review and critique delegation models.
By committing in advance to consider the legislation
under a rule restricting amendments, the floor can en-
hance the committee’s incentive to invest in information
acquisition.
The Gilligan and Krehbiel models are based on a
powerful but narrow notion of the common good in pol-
icymaking. In the models, legislators are uncertain about
the link between policies and outcomes, and committees
can acquire information about that link.When legislators
are risk averse, uncertainty reduction acts as a common
good “that is conceptually and mathematically distinct
from distributive consequences...” (Gilligan and Krehbiel
1990, 536). In a vast body of subsequent literature, uncer-
tainty reduction, expertise, and the common good have
becomeessentially synonymous, regardless ofwhether the
empirical domain is institutional design, lobbying, or del-
egation.1 However, for analytical tractability, most mod-
els in this tradition rely on assumptions about the nature
of uncertainty and expertise that, as noted by Callander
(2008), are technically restrictive, substantively nontriv-
ial, and ill-suited to some forms of policy expertise.
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With these issues in mind, we propose a valence-
based model of good public policy and analyze commit-
tee specialization as the production of policy valence. The
concept of valence has been used primarily in electoral
models as a reduced-form representation of candidate-
specific characteristics, such as charisma or competence,
that appeal to all voters.2 It has also been applied in the
judicial politics literature as a reduced-form representa-
tion of universally desirable opinion characteristics, such
as clarity and persuasiveness (Lax and Cameron 2007). In
our legislative model, valence serves as a reduced-form
representation of publicly observable information gen-
erated by legislative committees about how to achieve
universally desirable policy goals such as effectiveness,
efficiency, or cost reduction.
Ourmodeling choice is motivated by the observation
that congressional committees, their staff, and lobbyists
exert considerable effort to craft complex legislation that
must meet a number of nonspatial criteria to be success-
ful. Among other things, policies must be coherently de-
signed, appropriate to local circumstances, cost-effective,
and practical to implement given the resources and con-
straints of a sprawling federal bureaucracy. These consid-
erations, which are not spatial in nature, naturally suggest
a simple model of policy valence.
The two models most similar to ours are by
Londregan (2000) and Ting (2010). Londregan analyzes
the institutional implications of policy valence in Chile
and shows that the ability to generate high-valence poli-
cies gives the president informal agenda power, because
when the president crafts a high-valence bill the only
way the legislature can enjoy the valence benefits is to
adopt the president’s proposal. Ting focuses on bureau-
cratic agencies’ capacity for policy implementation, an-
alyzing a two-period principal-agent model of noncon-
tractable investment under the threat of second-period
policy changes. Although organizational capacity is not a
pure valence dimension, it is valued by both the principal
and the agent. A key innovation of Ting’s model is that he
draws a distinction between capacity that is specialized,
i.e., targeted toward one specific type of policy, versus
general, i.e., applicable across a wide range of policies.
When investment is specialized, the agent may acquire de
facto agenda power by investing in capacity to implement
his favored policy.
In contrast to Londregan and Ting, we focus on in-
tra legislative procedural choice. We apply and extend
2 See Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), and
Aragones and Palfrey (2002). Endogenous valence electoral models
include Caillaud and Tirole (2002), Meirowitz and Tucker (2007),
and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009).
their insights in the legislative context by analyzing dif-
ferent forms of valence, endogenizing its production, and,
most importantly, analyzing how informal valence-based
agenda power interacts with formal agenda power, i.e.,
legislative rules. We focus in particular on the degree
to which the publicly available information or valence
generated by committees about how to effectively design
one particular policy can be applied to design alternative
policies dealing with the same issue area. We term this
phenomenon information transferability.
At one extreme, legislative committees can generate
expertise that is applicable to a wide range of policies
dealing with the same issue area, i.e., valence is transfer-
able. One example of transferable valence comes from
the recent health care reform process: a key contribution
of the bipartisan “Gang of Six” negotiating in the Senate
Finance Committee was to design efficiency-increasing
changes to the Medicare reimbursements system.3 The
resulting information about how to achieve cost savings
could have been used to help finance liberal or moder-
ate health care reforms, or even conservative ones. A key
feature of transferable valence is that when a committee
exerts effort to craft high-quality legislation, it must con-
sider the possibility that a parent chamber with different
ideological objectives can expropriate this investment to
achieve different policy goals.
At the other extreme, a committee can generate ex-
pertise that is only applicable to one particular policy
option that the committee has worked on, i.e., valence
is policy-specific or nontransferable.4 For example, during
the health care reform process, the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions generated infor-
mation about how to design an effective public health
insurance plan.5 This information could only be applied
to legislation that actually included a public plan—it was
not transferable to more moderate reforms. A key fea-
ture of policy-specific valence is that when a committee
expends costly effort to craft high-quality legislation, it
does not need to worry about the floor expropriating
its investment to improve the quality of some alternative
policy option with a different ideological orientation.
To analyze how transferability affects procedural
choice in legislatures, we borrow the Gilligan and
Krehbiel (1987) model, but dispense with private
3 “Medicare system overhaul proposed by two senators,” New York
Times, April 30, 2009.
4 Our distinction between transferable and policy-specific valence
parallels similar distinctions made by Callander (2008) and Ting
(2010) in their work on delegation.
5 “Health care vote illustrates partisan divide,” New York Times,
July 16, 2009.
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information about the link between policy choices and
spatial outcomes. We first show that when valence is
transferable, our model generates results analogous to
the canonical model: to induce committee specialization,
a parent chamber will sometimes commit to consider
legislation under a closed rule. However, when valence
is policy-specific our results differ dramatically. Policy-
specific valence is inherently protected from expropria-
tion regardless of the rule, and we show that closed rules
actually reduce the committee’s incentive to specialize.
Consequently, closed rules are never optimal for the par-
ent chamber.
The reason for this surprising result is that the com-
mittee can use policy-specific valence to exert informal
agenda power and pull the policy outcome toward its
ideological ideal point. Specifically, if the committee pro-
poses a bill with a high level of policy-specific valence,
then even under an open rule the floor may choose not
to alter the ideological location of the bill because doing
so would result in a lower-valence policy. In our model,
restrictive rules and specialization are thus substitutable
means for the committee to achieve the same end, and we
show that the greater is the committee’s formal agenda
power via legislative rules, the less incentive it has to ob-
tain informal agenda power by producing policy-specific
valence.
Our results suggest that the ability to induce commit-
tee specialization with restrictive rules in the canonical
model is closely tied to the transferability of informa-
tion. We also extend our model to show that the parent
chamber may want to appoint a committee consisting of
preference outliers who place a high value on informal
agenda power and are therefore more willing to special-
ize. Finally, at a broader level, our analysis points out the
need to reconsider the nature of policy and information
in political contexts.
Information Expropriability
To illustrate the rationale behind our model of commit-
tee expertise, we first revisit the canonical informational
model that was developed by Crawford and Sobel (1982)
and applied by Gilligan and Krehbiel. In that framework,
players are assumed to be uncertain about the link be-
tween a policy p and the resulting outcome x. A player’s
preferences ui(x) are based only on the outcome, x, so
policies serve as potentially imperfect instruments for
achieving outcomes.
The canonical model assumes without loss of gener-
ality that the mapping between policies and outcomes is
a function that is determined by some unknown state of
the world, where x = f (p,). With considerable loss of
generality, but considerable gain in analytical tractability,
themodel further assumes that is simply a number that
acts as a common additive shock across policies, i.e., x =
p +  = f (p, ). Expertise is thus equivalent to learning
the value of .
While this restrictive setup facilitates analysis, it has
the peculiar feature that information is fully invertible
(Callander 2008), i.e., knowledge of the outcome x′ re-
sulting from a particular policy p′ enables an actor to
know what outcome x′′ will result from any other policy
p′′. The value of  encodes all relevant knowledge of the
complete mapping between policies and outcomes.
What sort of policy decision corresponds to such a
model? Consider the U.S. Congress setting the defense
budget at the height of the Cold War, under uncertainty
about Soviet capabilities. As an approximation, assume
that members of Congress are either hawks or doves.
Hawks believe that overwhelming military superiority is
necessary to maintain security, while doves believe that
parity is sufficient. In this example, which is inspired by
Krehbiel’s (1991, 82–83) discussion of defense spending,
a single piece of unknown information—the magnitude
of Soviet capabilities—determines a legislator’s prefer-
ences over all possible defense budgets, because legislator
preferences are over the force gap between the countries,
rather than the absolute size of the budget. If a hawkish
committee under the direction of a dovish floor learns the
true magnitude of Soviet capabilities, it wants to mislead
the floor intobelieving that the force gap is enormous.The
information is expropriable in the sense that, regardless
of the actual level of Soviet capabilities, if the floor learns
the true level it can use this knowledge to implement its
dovish policy of parity.
The canonical model is natural for certain policy ar-
eas, e.g., those in which the appropriate scale of the gov-
ernment’s response is increasing in the magnitude of a
problem. For example, when Congress decided what size
of fiscal stimulus to adopt in 2009, members were uncer-
tain about the severity of the recession, and the worse the
recession the larger would be each member’s most pre-
ferred stimulus package. However, the x = p +  model
is ill-suited to many other forms of information, particu-
larly those pertaining to efficiency or to coordination of
various components of a complex policy. In fact, many
of Krehbiel’s (1991) examples of information and exper-
tise are better described by a model of information as
policy-specific valence:
• Debates over whether the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative would work (62–63): a cost-effective, func-
tional missile shield is a high-valence policy, i.e.,
everyone, even doves, would prefer it over a costly
missile shield that doesn’t work.
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• Reforms of the Department of Housing andUrban
Development (63–64): these reforms proved to be
low-valence, i.e., bad from the perspective of both
liberals and conservatives, because they harmed
tenants’ health and safety while costing taxpayers
millions of dollars.
• Reforms to improve the functioning of the fed-
eral student loan system (85–86): these reforms
were high-valence, i.e., good from the perspective
of politicians across the political spectrum, because
they kept the system afloat, so that honest students
could receive loans and taxpayers would not have
to bail out lenders.
• A badly designed, i.e., low-valence, insurance pro-
gram for catastrophic medical care for the elderly
(93).
It is also worth noting that in many issue areas, in-
formation needed to successfully implement one policy
option is not readily transferable to other policies on
the same issue. For example, consider a government-
provided health plan. If a legislator learns how to de-
sign a public option that holds down costs by minimiz-
ing adverse selection, this information is not useful to a
legislator designing a single-payer system in which ad-
verse selection is irrelevant. And it surely is useless to a
libertarian working to design a fully privatized market.
Nonetheless, conditional on providing a public option
everyone would prefer a well-designed policy that holds
down costs rather than a poorly designed one. Hence, a
model of policy-specific valence is appropriate for study-
ing information in this empirical domain.
Before we turn to our analysis of legislative proce-
dures, we note that a model of policy-specific valence
is a natural way to study how expertise affects multiple
aspects of policy making. For example, variation in leg-
islators’ participation on different issues (Hall 1996) may
be explained by variation in their desire to exert informal
agenda power via the production of policy-specific va-
lence. Similarly, our model may explain why think tanks
and interest groups often present highly detailed policy
recommendations, including specific wording for legisla-
tion: although it is possible to interpret their actions as
equilibriumsignalingbehavior in a cheap-talk game, their
goal may well be simply to publicize well-designed, high-
valence policies that promote their ideological objectives.
TheModel
We develop a four-stage sequential game, played by a
committee and floor in a legislature, using a sequence
paralleling Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987). First, the floor
commits to consider the committee’s bill under a closed
rule or an open rule. Under a closed rule, the committee’s
bill is voted on, up or down, against an exogenous sta-
tus quo whereas under an open rule, the floor may offer
amendments and adopt whatever policy best promotes
its interests. Second, the committee chooses whether to
invest in valence production and, in the case of policy-
specific valence, chooses a target policy on which to in-
vest. Third, the outcome of the committee’s investment
is publicly revealed, and the committee refers a bill to
the floor for consideration. Fourth, the floor chooses
policy under the rule that it committed to in the first
stage.6
Policy in our model has two components: the ide-
ological location and the valence, or quality, associated
with the bill. Valence is valued by all players and is simply
a number v ∈ [0, ∞), whereas ideology is a point x ∈ R.
Thus, each bill is a point in two-dimensional real space
b = (v, x) ∈ R2. Players’ utility over the two dimensions
is additive, with
Ui (b) = v − i (|xi − x|) .
For each player i ∈ {f , c}, where f denotes the floor
and c the committee, i( · ) is a spatial loss function
defined over [0, ∞), capturing the utility loss arising
from movements away from a player’s preferred ideo-
logical policy xi. We assume that the loss functions are
strictly increasing, strictly convex, twice differentiable,
and that i(0) = ′i (0) = 0. Note that quadratic prefer-
ences are a special case of our setup, with i(d) = d2.
Without loss of generality we assume the floor median’s
ideal point is xf = 0 and the committee’s ideal point is
xc > 0. We also assume that the status quo policy q has
valence 0.
Because utility from valence is linear and additive,
our setup precludes interactions between ideology and
valence. For example, we cannot accommodate the no-
tion that a liberal legislator prefers that a conservative
policy be low quality because she hopes it will produce
bad effects and later be altered to a more ideologically
appealing policy. As in other valence models, valence is
by definition valued by everyone. Themeaning of valence
depends on the particular context. For example, it may
represent cost savings that do not affect the ideological
6 The Gilligan and Krehbiel model sequence does not reflect the
usual sequence of events in Congress, where rules are granted af-
ter committees design bills. Although Diermeier (1995) provides a
justification for procedural commitment, it is reasonable to criti-
cize this assumption. However, our most interesting results do not
depend on this assumption, because with policy-specific valence
the floor does not commit to a closed rule, even if it can do so.
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outcome of a policy; it also could represent any other
nonideological Pareto improvement in the quality of a
policy.7
As in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), only the com-
mittee has the ability to engage in costly investment.
However, the product of that investment is valence rather
than knowledge of an unknown state of the world .
Our model contains no private information, and the
committee’s investment decision is publicly observable.
The valence return is ex ante uncertain to both the
committee and the floor and, once revealed, is public
information.
The valence production process is as follows. First,
the committee selects the target policy x˜ ∈ R. In the case
of policy-specific valence, any information the committee
subsequently acquires will be tailored toward implement-
ing x˜ . Next, the committee decides whether to invest in
costly specialization. If the committee does not invest, the
valence of the target policy is 0. If it invests, the committee
pays an up-front fixed cost c and receives a probabilistic
valence return v˜ from a distribution F( · ) with density
f ( · ). For simplicity we assume that valence returns may
only be positive and that all positive returns are pos-
sible; specifically F( · ) is continuous, equal to 0 over
(−∞, 0], and strictly increasing over [0, +∞). We also
assume that F(v) has a finite expectation E[v] < ∞ and
a nondecreasing hazard rate f (·)1−F (·) . The last assumption
is satisfied by many standard distributions, such as the
exponential, and is only a sufficient, not necessary, con-
dition for our results.
Once the committee observes the valence realization
v˜, it can revisit its choice of policy before referring a bill
to the floor. However, the consequences of bill revision
depend on the transferability of valence, which is exoge-
nous. We model two alternative forms of valence. In the
first, valence generated in committee can be applied to
all policies. Hence, it is transferable, and if the committee
rewrites (or the floor amends) the bill to implement an
alternative spatial policy x ′ = x˜ it retains v˜. The nature
of valence in the transferable game is analogous to the
p +  model, where knowledge of  enables a decision
maker to implement any desired outcome. The second
form of valence is policy-specific, i.e., the return generated
by the committee’s investment is tailored exclusively to
the target policy. The valence v˜ cannot be transferred to
7 Valence could also be interpreted as reduction in variance in a
purely spatial model with quadratic preferences. Transferable va-
lencewould be a shock reduction that applies to any policy, whereas
policy-specific valencewould be a shock reduction that applies only
to one specific policy x˜ . We thank an anonymous referee for this
observation.
other policies, and if the committee rewrites the bill to
implement x ′ = x˜, the resulting bill has zero valence.8
Under an open rule and absent the opportunity for
valence production, the unique equilibrium outcome is
simply the floor’s ideal point. Under a closed rule, the
outcome depends on the location of the status quo policy
q. We consider the case where xf = 0 < q ≤ xc , i.e., the
status quo is in the Pareto set between the committee and
the floor. The unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(henceforth, “equilibrium” ) outcome that prevails in the
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) closed-rule agenda-setter
model absent valence is simply gridlock.9
Preview of Results
For each variant of our model—transferable and policy-
specific valence—we characterize equilibriumpolicy out-
comes, committee investment decisions, and floor rule
choices. Equilibria are unique up to these characteristics
and are solved by backward induction. We specify and
compare policy outcomes in four cases: valence is either
transferable or policy-specific, and the rule can be either
open or closed. Here we give a brief overview of our re-
sults.
Both the floor’s rule choice and the up-front cost of
valence investment influence the committee’s incentive to
invest in valence production. Our first key result is that
when valence is transferable, the committee’s incentive to
invest under a closed rule is greater than under an open
rule. In the canonical model, this effect arises because the
protection afforded by closed rules results in more effi-
cient information transmission. In our model, the trans-
ferability of valence makes a closed rule necessary for the
committee to exert informal agenda power using high-
valence policies, because under an open rule the floor
simply expropriates any valence generated in committee
and attaches it to its most preferred ideological policy.
8 Having introduced our model of valence, we have three brief
comments on technical details: (1) as shown in the Supplemental
Appendix, our substantive results hold if the status quo has valence
vq > 0, (2) our analysis is largely unchanged if the valence dis-
tribution F(·) has a point mass at 0, and (3) the assumption that
zero-valence policies are always available implies that it suffices
to consider valence distributions with positive support, because
negative valence returns can be freely discarded.
9 The case −xc < q ≤ 0< xc is identical, because the committee’s
most preferred policy among those that it can enact under a closed
rule is −q, which is between 0 and xc . Similarly, standard agenda-
setting models imply that the cases where 0 < xc < q or q ≤ −xc <
0 < xc are identical to the case of q = xc .
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TABLE 1 Results
Transferable Valence
Cost of Investment Committee Investment Floor Rule Choice
Low Always invest under either rule Open
Intermediate Invest under closed but not under open Closed if valence benefit
exceeds ideological cost
High Never invest under either rule Open
Policy-Specific Valence
Cost of Investment Committee Investment Floor Rule Choice
Low Always invest under either rule Open
Intermediate Invest under open but not under closed Open
High Never invest under either rule Open
For intermediate costs of specialization, a closed rule
is necessary and sufficient to induce committee invest-
ment. This property is a key part of the standard infor-
mational rationale for closed rules, because closed rules
result in noncentrist ideological outcomes. Due to this
property, equilibriumbehavior in the transferable valence
variant of our model is similar to Gilligan and Krehbiel’s
(1987) results, as seen in the top half of Table 1.10
When the cost of investment is intermediate and the
floor’s choice of rule affects the committee’s investment
decision, the floor selects a closed rule only if the valence
gains are sufficiently attractive and the committee is suf-
ficiently moderate. This pattern arises because extreme
committees use formal agenda power more aggressively,
resulting in greater ideological losses for the floor. We
show in Proposition 1 how the floor weighs valence ben-
efits against ideological costs when deciding whether to
adopt a closed rule.
When valence is policy-specific, the equilibrium is
dramatically different. Our key result, Proposition 3, is
that a committee’s incentive to invest in valence is stronger
under an open rule than under a closed rule. As a con-
sequence, with policy-specific valence the floor always
selects an open rule (Proposition 4). This pattern of be-
havior, summarized in the bottom half of Table 1, stands
in stark contrast to both our transferable valence game
and the Gilligan and Krehbiel model.
The underlying reason for this result is that the com-
mittee can use policy-specific valence to exercise informal
agenda power under either rule. For example, under an
open rule, if the committee produces a bill with a high
10 Krishna and Morgan (2005) characterize a closed-rule equilib-
rium that Pareto-dominates the one characterized by Gilligan and
Krehbiel. However, as pointed out by Krehbiel (2005), this result of
Krishna andMorgan’s “strengthens the informational rationale for
restrictive rules” in the x = p + model with a single committee.
level of policy-specific valence, the floor may be unwill-
ing to amend the bill because doing so would result in a
loss of the valence benefits from the committee’s invest-
ment. Thus, preventing expropriation no longer requires
a closed rule. In fact, closed rules and valence are sub-
stitutable means for exercising agenda power, and the
agenda power conferred by a closed rule reduces the
marginal ideological rents that the committee can ex-
tract with valence, thereby decreasing its incentives to
invest.11
Notation. Before presenting our results we first intro-
duce some notation. Recall that f (·) is the floor’s spatial
loss function over the ideology dimension.Define v¯ (x ; q)
as
v¯ (x ; q) =  f (|x|) −  f (|q |) . (1)
So v¯ (x ; q) is the level of valence that makes the floor
indifferent between a bill (v¯ (x ; q) , x) and the status quo
(0, q). Note that v¯ (x ; q) inherits most of the properties
of f (·); in particular, it is increasing and convex in x.
Let x¯ (v; q) be implicitly defined as the unique ideo-
logical location greater than xf such that
v =  f (|x¯ (v; q)|) −  f (|q |) . (2)
Given a level of valence v, the floor is indifferent between a
bill (v, x¯ (v; q)) and (0, q). Hence (v, x¯ (v; q)) is the most
extreme bill with valence v that the floor weakly prefers
to the status quo. Clearly x¯ (v; q) is increasing in v, i.e.,
the floor is willing to accept more ideologically extreme
bills the greater is the attached valence.
11 The idea that an actor without formal authority can achieve
informal authority by learning about consequences is found in
Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) analysis of delegation. Our work differs
substantially in that we use a valence-based modeling technology
and apply our model to legislative procedural choice in a spatial
model of policy.
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In each subgame, the committee’s investment deci-
sion can be characterized by a unique cost cutpoint such
that the committee chooses to invest in valence if and only
if c is below this cutpoint. Higher cutpoints imply greater
incentives to invest. We write ctcl(xc , q), c
t
o(xc), c
nt
cl (xc , q),
and cnto (xc) to denote the cutpoints—subscripts refer to
the rule (closed or open) and superscripts refer to the type
of valence (transferable or nontransferable). In the case of
policy-specific valence, to fully describe the committee’s
strategy it is also necessary to describe the committee’s
choice of a target policy, which we write as x˜ cl (xc , q) and
x˜o (xc ) for a closed and open rule, respectively.
Transferable Valence
We first solve our transferable valence game for the case
where the floor chooses an open rule. We then solve the
closed-rule case and determine the floor’s optimal rule
choice.
Open Rule. The case of transferable valence under an
open rule is straightforward. In the final stage of the
game, regardless of the valence attached, the floor will
amend any bill bˆ referred by the committee to its own
ideal point (xf = 0) along the ideological dimension, be-
cause valence is transferable andamendments are costless.
The committee can do nothing to change the outcome in
the ideological dimension, so its incentive to invest is de-
termined only by valence benefits, which are simply the
expected return of the investment E[v]. The cutpoint for
the cost of investment is thus cto(xc) = E[v].
In summary, if valence is transferable, then under an
open rule committee behavior and policy outcomes are
as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if the
cost of investing is sufficiently low, i.e., c ≤ cto(xc)= E[v].
(2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome
is (0, 0). (3) If the committee invests and the investment
returns valence v˜, the policy outcome is (v˜, 0).
Closed Rule. Under a closed rule with transferable va-
lence, our model is a straightforward variant of a Romer-
Rosenthal agenda-setter game. In the final stage, the com-
mittee has referred a bill bˆ = (vˆ, xˆ) and the floor accepts
the bill if and only if vˆ ≥ v¯ (xˆ, q), the valence cutoff from
equation (1) such that the floor is at least as well off as
under the status quo.
We now focus on the penultimate stage. Under an
open rule, valence transferability allowed the floor to ex-
propriate any valence generated in committee for its own
policy ends, so the committee could not exert informal
agendapowerwithhigh-valencepolicies. In contrast,with
the formal protection of a closed rule, the ability to trans-
fer valence across policies is retained solely by the com-
mittee. Thus, after observing the realized level of valence,
the committee can alter the bill’s ideological location to
leave the floor indifferent between the referred bill and
the status quo.
Formally, for each realization of valence v˜, the com-
mittee transfers the valence to the best ideological pol-
icy, for itself, that leaves the floor at least as well off
as with the status quo. If the realized valence is suffi-
ciently high, i.e., v˜ ≥ v¯(xc ; q), the committee is able to
implement its own ideal point. Otherwise, the farthest it
can pull policy, while still getting the floor’s approval, is
x¯ (v˜; q) = −1f ( f (q) + v˜). The committee’s optimal bill
is bˆ = (v˜, xˆ), where xˆ ≡ min {xc , x¯ (v˜; q)}.
The closed-rule equilibrium is shown in Figure 1,
which graphs ideological policy outcomes as a function
of the valence realization. For a low v˜ the committee pro-
poses a policy on the ideological dimension that traces
out the floor’s indifference curve through the status quo
policy (0,q). For ahigh realizationof valence, the commit-
tee proposes its own ideal point xc and the floor strictly
prefers the committee’s proposal over (0, q). The floor
only enjoys the benefits of valence utility when valence is
sufficiently high to sate the committee’s desire to extract
ideological policy rents.
If the committee invests in valence, its expectedutility
is E [v] − ∫ v¯(xc ;q)0 c (xc − x¯(v; q)) f (v)dv. If it does not
invest, policy is gridlocked at q and its utility is −c(xc −
q). Subtracting the latter from the former, we derive the
cost cutpoint determining the incentive to invest:
c tcl (xc , q) ≡ E [v] +
∫ v¯(xc ;q)
0
(c (xc − q)
− c (xc − x¯(v; q)) f (v)dv
+ (1 − F (v¯(xc ; q)))c (xc − q). (3)
The first term in this expression is the value of the va-
lence itself, which is the same as in the open-rule case.
The second and third terms represent the ideological
benefits that the committee achieves by using valence
as leverage to pull policy toward its own ideal point. It is
important to note that because of this ideological gain,
the committee has a greater incentive to invest in exper-
tise under a closed rule than under an open rule, i.e.,
c tcl (xc , q) = c to(xc ) = E [v].
In summary, if valence is transferable, then under
a closed rule committee behavior and policy outcomes
are as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if
the cost of investing is sufficiently low, i.e., c ≤ ctcl(xc , q).
(2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome
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FIGURE 1 Closed-Rule Outcome with Transferable Valence
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is (0, q). (3)If the committee invests and the investment
returns valence v˜, the policy outcome is (v˜, xˆ), where
xˆ ≡ min {xc , x¯ (v˜; q)} .
Rule Choice. If the floor’s rule choice does not affect
the committee’s investment decision, the floor prefers an
open rule because it receives its own ideal point along the
ideology dimension and valence utility at least as high as
under a closed rule.
However, as is the case for some parameter values
in the Gilligan and Krehbiel model, in our transferable
valence game, for intermediate costs of specialization the
committee invests if and only if it receives a closed rule.12
We now solve for the floor’s optimal rule choice in such
cases, i.e., when c ∈ (cto(xc), ctcl(xc , q)]. The floor’s expected
utility under a closed rule is
−
∫ v¯(xc ;q)
0
 f (q) f (v) dv
+
∫ ∞
v¯(xc ;q)
(v −  f (xc )) f (v)dv. (4)
12 As an aside, note that in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) the floor
may sometimes prefer a restrictive rule even if the rule choice is
not pivotal for the committee’s investment decision. However, this
requires that the committee’s preferences be closely aligned with
the floor. In that model, the closed rule not only provides the
committee with ideological rents but also is more informationally
efficient, i.e., the value of the collective benefit itself is greater under
the closed rule. This feature does not extend to our model.
Equation (4) has two components. When the valence re-
alization is below v¯ (xc ; q), the floor enjoys no valence
benefits because the committee extracts them all in the
form of ideological policy rents. The floor is forced to
accept a policy no better than the status quo, resulting in
utility −f (q). However, when the valence realization is
above v¯ (xc ; q), the committee extracts no additional ide-
ological rents (it receives its own ideal point and is sated),
and the floor enjoys the extra benefits of valence, i.e., v −
f (xc) is strictly greater than −f (q). Because the floor’s
utility under an open rule absent investment is simply
0, the floor prefers a closed rule with investment to an
open rule with no investment if and only if equation (4)
is positive.
If the committee’s ideal point is exactly at the sta-
tus quo xc = q, equation (4) equals E[v] − f (q), the
expected value of the valence return minus the floor’s
utility loss of accepting the noncentrist status quo point
q. Also, equation (4) is strictly decreasing in xc and ap-
proaches −f (q) < 0 as xc → ∞ (Lemma 3 in the ap-
pendix). Intuitively these properties are obvious; a more
extreme committee is less easily sated, so under a closed
rule it leaves the floor with less surplus valence util-
ity. In the limit, an infinitely extreme committee ex-
tracts all valence benefits in the form of ideological pol-
icy rents, leaving the floor no better off than with the
status quo.
Thus, the floor’s equilibriumrule choices are straight-
forward. If the status quo q is sufficiently extreme, i.e.,
POLICY-SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND INFORMAL AGENDA POWER 75
FIGURE 2 Investment Decisions and Outcomes with Transferable
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f (q) ≥ E[v], then regardless of the committee’s ideal
point the value of valence is insufficient to overcome the
ideological loss resulting from a closed rule. Alternatively,
if q is relatively moderate, i.e., f (q) < E[v], there is an
upper bound on the committee’s ideal point x¯c (q) > q
such that the floor would find it worthwhile to grant a
closed rule in order to induce specialization. Combining
these observations, we now characterize the floor’s op-
timal rule choice as a function of the committee’s ideal
point xc and the cost of investment, c. These equilibrium
rule choices are shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 1. With transferable valence, the floor
strictly prefers a closed rule to an open rule if and only
if both of the following conditions hold.
(i)A closed rule will induce the committee to invest
when it otherwise would not, i.e.,
c ∈ (c to (xc ) , c tcl (xc , q)] .
(ii)The valence benefit to the floor exceeds the ideolog-
ical loss from the closed rule, i.e.,
∫∞
v¯(xc ;q)
(v −  f (xc )) f (v)dv ≥∫ v¯(xc ;q)
0  f (q) f (v)dv. This may equivalently
be written as
a. q < q∗ , where q∗ solves f (q∗) = E[v]
b. xc ∈ (q , x¯c (q)) , where x¯c (q) solves
−
∫ v¯(x¯c (q);q)
0
 f (q) f (v) dv
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x¯c (q);q)
(v −  f (x¯c (q))) f (v)dv = 0
Overall, the results in this section closely parallel the
results in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), despite the fact
that we use a very different model of information. In
both models, specialization is beneficial to both the floor
and the committee. If the cost of investment is low, the
committee always specializes regardless of the floor’s rule
choice. On the other hand, if the cost is high the commit-
tee never invests. For intermediate cost levels, the com-
mittee’s decision about whether to specialize depends on
the rule under which its bill will be considered.
However, as we show below, when valence is policy-
specific, the nature of the equilibrium is dramatically
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different. This indicates that the threat of expropriation
is a key factor driving the canonical results.
Policy-Specific Valence
We now analyze the case of policy-specific valence. In the
transferable valence game, we did not characterize the
committee’s initial choice of a target policy x˜ because va-
lence generated by the committee’s investment could be
freely transferred across policies. With policy-specific va-
lence, however, the valence returned by the committee’s
investment v˜ is attached solely to the target policy, and if
either the committee or the floor chooses to alter the ide-
ology of the bill, the fruits of the committee’s investment
are lost.
The committee’s choice of a target policy is there-
fore a critical component of its strategy. If it works on
an extreme policy, its bill will only be enacted by the
floor if a high valence return is realized, which occurs
with low probability. However, if the committee chooses
a moderate target policy, it potentially foregoes ideologi-
cal rents, because for high valence returns the floor would
be willing to enact a more extreme policy. We now char-
acterize the committee’s investment decisions, including
its choice of a target policy. The committee’s equilibrium
behavior under an open rule can be treated as a spe-
cial case of the closed rule, which we therefore analyze
first.
Closed Rule. The final stage (floor vote) under a closed
rule is identical to the transferable valence case. In the
penultimate stage (committee proposal), note that for
any valence realization v˜ the committee has no incentive
to amend its bill bˆ from the target policy x˜ . Any alternative
bill preferredby the committeewill have 0 valence because
valence is nontransferable. Because q ∈ (0, xc), such bills
fail against the status quo. In contrast to our transferable
valence model, with policy-specific valence the commit-
tee has no incentive to alter the bill after observing the
valence realization, so the set of equilibrium ideologi-
cal policy outcomes is binary. Either the status quo pre-
vails (if v < v¯ (x˜ ; q)), or the target policy x˜ prevails (if
v ≥ v¯ (x˜ ; q)).
Proceeding backward to the investment decision and
selection of the target policy, suppose that the committee
has chosen to invest. The optimal target policymaximizes
the committee’s expected utility conditional on invest-
ment. Clearly the committee will not select a target policy
x˜ < q or x˜ > xc because it would be better off working
on either q or xc . We denote the optimal target policy as
x˜ cl (xc , q), which is
x˜ cl (xc , q) = argmax
x˜∈[q ,xc ]
{
− F (v¯ (x˜ ; q))c (xc − q)
− (1 − F (v¯ (x˜ ; q))) c (xc − x˜)
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x˜ ;q)
v f (v) dv
}
. (5)
The first term of the maximand is the committee’s ideo-
logical loss when the valence v˜ is insufficient to beat the
status quo, which occurs with probability F (v¯ (x˜ ; q)).
The second term is the ideological loss when v˜ is suffi-
cient to pass the target policy x˜ , which is better for the
committee than the status quo, but weakly worse than its
own ideal point xc . The third term is the committee’s util-
ity from valence. Note that this equals (1 − F (v¯ (x˜ ; q))) ·
E [v|v ≥ v¯ (x˜, q)], the probability that the target policy
passes times the expected value of valence conditional on
passage. This is strictly less than E[v] because valence is
lost when the floor chooses to maintain the status quo.
We now state our first result for the case of policy-
specific valence, which characterizes the optimal target
policy x˜ cl (xc , q) under a closed rule. The appendix has
the proof of this result, as well as others not proved in the
main text.
Lemma 1. When valence is policy-specific, if the com-
mittee chooses to invest its optimal closed-rule target policy
x˜cl (xc , q) is unique, strictly interior to [q, xc], and strictly
increasing in q.
We now turn to the committee’s equilibrium invest-
ment decision. When the committee chooses not to in-
vest, the status quo prevails, and its utility is −c(xc −
q). When it invests, its expected utility is the maximum
of equation (5). To derive the cost cutpoint for invest-
ment, cntcl (xc , q), we substitute the optimum x˜
cl (xc , q)
into equation (5) and subtract −c(xc − q).
cntcl (xc , q) ≡
(
1 − F (v¯ (x˜ cl (xc , q) ; q))) [c (xc − q)
− c
(
xc − x˜ cl (xc , q)
) ]+ ∫ ∞
v¯(x˜ cl (xc ,q);q)
v f (v) dv
(6)
In summary, if valence is policy-specific, then under
a closed rule committee behavior and policy outcomes
are as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if
the cost of investing is sufficiently low, i.e., c ≤ cntcl (xc , q).
(2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome
is (0, q). (3) If the committee invests and the investment
returns valence v˜, the policy outcome is (v˜, x˜ cl (xc , q)) if
v˜ ≥ v¯(x˜ cl (xc , q); q) and (0, q) otherwise.
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Open Rule. We now characterize the committee’s invest-
ment behavior under an open rule. To simplify the analy-
sis, we first show that in the policy-specific valence game
the open-rule subgame can be solved as a special case
of the closed-rule subgame with q = 0, because both
subgames result in the same policy outcome after every
possible bill referral by the committee.
Lemma 2. If valence is policy-specific, then equilib-
rium expected payoffs for every investment decision and
choice of target policy by the committee are identical be-
tween an open rule subgame and a closed-rule subgame
with q = 0.
Applying the lemma, we can substitute q = 0 into
the closed-rule results to derive the committee’s invest-
ment behavior under an open rule. Recall that the optimal
open-rule target policy is x˜o (xc ). For simplicity, we write
the valence cutoff v¯ (x ; 0) as v¯ (x) =  f (x). Following
equation (5),
x˜o(xc ) = argmax
x∈[0,xc ]
{
− F (v¯ (x))c (xc ) − (1 − F (v¯ (x)))
×c (xc − x) +
∫ ∞
v¯(x)
v f (v) dv
}
.
(7)
We now state a corollary to Lemma 1 for the open-
rule case, and compare the closed- and open-rule target
policies.
Proposition 2. With policy-specific valence, if the
committee chooses to invest under an open rule, its opti-
mal target policy x˜o (xc ) is unique and strictly interior to
[0, xc].Moreover, x˜o (xc ) < x˜ cl (xc , q) for all q > 0.
Proof . The first statement follows trivially from the
fact that x˜o (xc ) = x˜ cl (xc , 0), while the second follows
from the fact that x˜ cl (xc , q) is strictly increasing in q, as
shown in Lemma 1. 
Intuitively we would expect the target policy under
an open rule to be more moderate than that under a
closed rule; the proposition demonstrates formally that
this holds for any status quo point q > 0. Later, we will
show that this is one factor that ensures that the floor
prefers an open rule when valence is policy-specific.
Finally, as in the closed-rule case we subtract off
−c(xc), the committee’s utility if it chooses not to in-
vest and the floor passes its own ideal point, from the
maximum of equation (7) and derive the open-rule cost
cutpoint cnto (xc) for committee investment:
cnto (xc ) ≡ (1 − F (v¯ (x˜o (xc ))))
[
c (xc )
− c (xc − x˜o (xc ))
]+ ∫ ∞
v¯(x˜o(xc ))
v f (v) dv.
(8)
In summary, if valence is policy-specific, then under
a closed rule committee behavior and policy outcomes are
as follows. (1)The committee invests if and only if the cost
is sufficiently low, i.e., c ≤ cnto (xc). (2) If the committee
does not invest, the policy outcome is (0, 0). (3) If the
committee does invest and the investment returns valence
v˜, the policy outcome is (v˜, x˜o (xc )) if v˜ ≥ v¯ (x˜o (xc )) and
(0, 0) otherwise.
RuleChoice. The rule chosenby the floordependson two
factors: the policy outcomes that prevail and the commit-
tee’s incentive to invest under each type of rule. In the
transferable valence game, the floor sometimes faced a
trade-off in which it had to adopt a closed rule and sac-
rifice ideological rents to give the committee sufficient
incentives to invest. For policy-specific valence, no such
trade-off exists. We prove that open rules not only gener-
ate more moderate policy outcomes (Proposition 2), but
also create greater incentives for the committee to invest.
Proposition3. If valence is policy-specific, then cntcl (xc ,
q) < cnto (xc) for all q > 0. For any cost c ∈ (cntcl (xc , q),
cnto (xc)], the committee will invest under an open rule, but
not under a closed rule.
Why do the beneficial incentive effects of closed rules
vanish? When valence is policy-specific, a high valence
return makes the committee’s chosen target policy more
attractive to the floor, but has no effect on the quality
of the other available policy alternatives. As a result, the
committee retains the ability to exert informal agenda
power absent formal procedural rights. Regardless of the
rule, the floor must accept the committee’s target policy
to enjoy the fruits of its valence return. This severs the
link between restrictive rules and valence-driven agenda
power, and they become substitutable means for achiev-
ing the same end.
Mathematically, a closed rule allows the committee
to hold policy at the status quo q > 0. Because utility
is concave in the ideological dimension, the committee’s
ideological benefits from pulling policy in its direction
from q by a fixed increment  are smaller than the ben-
efits of pulling policy away from xf = 0 by that same .
Also, when policy begins at q > 0 rather than the floor’s
ideal point, the floor is less easily persuaded (i.e., needs
to see higher valence returns) to agree to move policy
by  toward the committee’s ideal point. Consequently,
the committee’s utility benefits from exercising informal
agendapowerwith valence are greater under anopen rule.
The better incentive properties of the open rule, com-
bined with the more moderate policy outcomes it gener-
ates (Proposition 2) together imply that the floor has an
unconditional preference for open rules when valence
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is policy-specific, a striking contrast with Gilligan and
Krehbiel’s results.
Proposition 4. With policy-specific valence, the floor
selects an open rule for all values of c, q, and xc .
Given our previous results, the formal argument un-
derlying this proposition is almost trivial. When the cost
of investment is either low or high, the floor’s rule deci-
sion has no effect on the committee’s decision to invest,
and hence the floor prefers the more moderate policy
produced by an open rule.When the cost of investment is
intermediate, from Proposition 3 we know that the com-
mittee invests in valence only under an open rule. Then
under an open rule the outcome is either the floor’s ideal
point xf = 0 with no valence, or a bill (v˜, x˜o (xc )) that
is even better for the floor. In either case the floor is bet-
ter off than under a closed rule, which guarantees that it
receives the status quo policy q with no valence.
Application: Committee
Composition
Havinganalyzed rule choice,webriefly analyze committee
membership. Gilligan and Krehbiel’s prediction that the
floor would choose centrist committees produced much
empirical debate (e.g., Hall and Grofman 1990; Krehbiel
1991; Londregan and Snyder 1994). In our model, un-
like Gilligan and Krehbiel’s work, a floor may prefer to
appoint preference outliers to committees. Although the
floorwould like tohave a centrist committee that exerts ef-
fort to produce high-quality centrist legislation, it knows
that if the cost of specialization is high, a centrist commit-
tee will be unwilling to specialize. In such cases the floor
may choose to appoint outliers who place a higher value
on informal agenda power and thus are more willing to
specialize.
The fact that extreme committees place a high value
on informal agenda power follows directly from risk aver-
sion. To see this, suppose that a committee with quadratic
preferences and ideal point xc > 0 faces the choice of ac-
cepting the policy outcome 0, or paying a price c > 0
to move policy to x ∈ (0, xc) with probability p. The
committee’s willingness to pay for this option is(
(1 − p) (− (xc − 0)2)+ p (− (xc − x)2))
− (− (xc − 0)2) = −px2 + (2px) · xc .
Note that this expression is increasing in the committee’s
ideal point, due to concavity of its utility function. This is
the basic reason that a more extreme committee is willing
to pay a higher cost to generate valence that can be used
to pull policy toward its ideal point.
To see how the committee’s investment incentives
affect the floor’s decision about whether to appoint a
centrist or an outlier committee, we briefly consider the
following special case of an extension to our model.13
Assume that the players have quadratic loss functions
f (d) = c(d) = d2, valence is exponentially distributed
with density f (v) = e−v , and the status quo is q = 12 .
Suppose that prior to the game the floor, which has
an ideal point at 0, can select the ideal point of the
committee, xc , from the set
{
0, 34 ,
3
2
}
. What xc would it
choose?
Transferable Valence. If valence is transferable, then the
floor only appoints an outlier xc > 0 if it plans to use
a closed rule to induce specialization. By Proposition 1,
the committee’s preferences thus cannot be too extreme,
i.e., xc ≤ x¯c (q). Given our simplifying assumptions, the
most extreme committee to which the floor is willing to
grant a closed rule is x¯c (q) =
√
q 2 − ln (q 2) ≈ 1.28 for
q = 12 . So in this example, the floor would be willing to
appoint the moderate outlier xc = 34 if necessary to in-
duce specialization, but would never appoint the extreme
outlier xc = 32 .
The optimal appointee depends on the cost of spe-
cialization, because as cost increases the committee must
be more extreme to find specialization worthwhile. If the
cost is intermediate, e.g., c = 1.04, the floor optimally
appoints the moderate outlier xc = 34 because it will spe-
cialize, but a centrist committee xc = 0 would not. Alter-
natively, if the cost of specialization is high, e.g., c = 1.1,
the floor chooses the centrist committee xc = 0, expecting
no specialization to occur. Although the extreme outlier
xc = 32 would specialize if granted a closed rule, the re-
sulting distributive costs are too great for the floor to be
willing to grant a closed rule.
Policy-Specific Valence. If valence is policy-specific, the
floor will always use an open rule and thus is always better
off appointing an outlier committee that will specialize
over a centrist one that will not. If the floor appoints an
outlier that fails to produce enough valence v˜ on its target
policy x˜o (xc ) to leave the floor better off than with its
own ideal point xf = 0, the floor can simply amend the
policy and be no worse off.
The committee’s target policy x˜o (xc ) is strictly in-
creasing in its ideal point: x˜o
(
3
4
) ≈ .448 and x˜o ( 32) ≈
.560. The floor therefore desires to appoint the most
13 A complete analysis of the design of committees is in the supple-
mental appendix.
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moderate committee willing to specialize. If the cost of
specialization is intermediate, e.g., c = 1.2 > E[v] = 1,
the floor appoints the moderate outlier xc = 34 because
both outliers would specialize but the centrist committee
would not. If the cost of specialization is high, e.g., c =
1.5, the floor must appoint the extreme outlier xc = 32 to
ensure specialization.
In summary, the example demonstrates that with ei-
ther type of valence the floor may prefer to have non-
centrist committees. The most important implication of
this section is that the widely held intuition (starting with
Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991) that mod-
els of expertise and information provision imply a floor
preference for centrist committees is not general; rather,
that intuition is specific to the private-information mod-
els used by those authors. In our model, as in previous
informational models, the congressional committee sys-
tem is designed to produce high-quality legislation. The
difference is that in our model, the parent chamber can
have an incentive to construct committees composed of
preference outliers.
Robustness
In this section, we discuss how our key results extend to
alternative model specifications, starting with technical
features and then considering more substantial changes
to our theoretical approach.
At a technical level, the structure of the utility func-
tions for the two players in our model can be generalized,
because they are constrained neither to weight ideology
against valence in a particular proportion nor to place the
same relative weight on valence. Also, our analysis does
not require symmetry on the spatial component of util-
ity functions. More generally, in the transferable valence
game, the results hold for certain types of interactions
between ideology and valence, including arbitrary utility
functionsUf (v, x) andUc(v, x) that are strictly increasing
in v for any x, strictly single peaked in x for any v, and
have the same peak xi for any v. In the nontransferable
valence game, a sufficient condition for our key results
is that the utility functions can be written as Ui(v, x) =
gi(v) + hi(x), with gi increasing and hi strictly concave
for both players.
More importantly, the key result in our policy-
specific valencemodeldoesnothingeon the sharpdiscon-
tinuity implied by fully policy-specific valence: it can be
extended to the case of partially transferable valence, pro-
vided that valence is not too transferable. For example, as-
sume a continuous valence decay function g (v˜, |x˜ − x|).
In this specification, the level of valence associated with
the target policy x˜ is v˜, and the function g( ·, ·) specifies
the amountof valence remainingwhen thebill is amended
to an alternative policy x.14 The negative incentive effects
from closed rules remain, provided that g2( ·, ·), the first
derivative of valence with respect to movements in the
ideology dimension away from the target policy, is suffi-
ciently negative. In fact, when |g2( ·, ·)|>′f (xc), the result
not only remains but the formal analysis is identical. The
intuition is straightforward: if valence is only transferable
to policies very close to the initial target policy x˜ , then un-
der an open rule the floor makes only very small changes
to the committee referral, because the marginal valence
loss quickly exceeds the marginal ideological benefit.
Finally, and most importantly, we can use our model
to analyze what happens if the committee, but not the
floor, can transfer valence, so that although valence is
transferable it is inherently nonexpropriable. Such a setup
is natural if expertise in a policy area consists of skill in
drafting legislation that will survive legal challenges and
be implemented properly by administrative agencies. Al-
though the polar cases we have analyzed – valence trans-
ferable by either actor or by neither actor—are appropri-
ate for many issue areas, such as health care reform, there
surely are other policy areas in which valence is transfer-
able by the committee but not by the floor. Analysis of
a model with this sort of valence yields results similar to
the ones we present here for policy-specific valence: the
floor always chooses open rules, which are more effec-
tive than closed rules in inducing the committee to invest
in expertise. Details can be found in the supplemental
appendix.
Conclusion
To conclude, we revisit our key contributions and dis-
cuss their implications in greater depth. For the past two
decades, the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model has been
so influential that formal theorists’ notions of goodpublic
policy have been, with very few exceptions, based on un-
certainty reduction inmodels of incomplete information.
Despite the many advances such work has produced, we
believe that it is a mistake for scholars collectively to lock
in to a singlemodeling technology, particularly given that
for many empirical applications a valence-based model is
more natural than the x = p +  setup.
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we
tackle a question that is largely infeasible in the standard
14 This setup is related to Callander’s (2008) Brownian motion
model, which formalizes the intuition that actors’ expected util-
ity declines as policy is shifted away from previously developed
options.
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model—the effect of information transferability on pro-
cedural choice. As noted in the introduction and in our
discussion of information expropriability, for many types
of policies, particularly those that require careful coor-
dination of many components of a complicated piece of
legislation, information that is gathered to craft one bill
cannot be readily applied to other bills elsewhere in the
ideological spectrum.
When valence is transferable, our results are quite
similar toGilligan andKrehbiel’s (1987). This fact has two
implications. At a technical level, Gilligan and Krehbiel’s
results on legislative procedures are more general than
previously understood, because they can be obtained in a
model of information as transferable valence as well as in
a model of information as private knowledge of . How-
ever, at an applied level, many scholars implicitly assume
that results from the x = p+ setup apply to any type of
policy-relevant information. This interpretation simply is
not correct, because Gilligan and Krehbiel’s results hinge
on the fact that a restrictive rule is necessary to prevent the
floor from expropriating the committee’s investment. In
sharp contrast, in our model with policy-specific infor-
mation, the committee’s investment is protected by the
nature of the information itself. As a result, open rules
are superior for inducing committee effort, because they
give the committee a greater incentive to obtain informal
agenda power by crafting a well-designed, high-valence
proposal that the floor is willing to enact. A comparison
of our two models suggests a new testable prediction for
future empirical research: committees are more likely to
operate under restrictive rules when the nature of their
expertise is transferable than when it is policy-specific.
Finally, we note that there are many possible theoret-
ical extensions of our framework for studying specializa-
tion and expertise. Here we note three possibilities. First,
the model could be used to analyze situations in which
legislation can be developed bymultiple committees, fac-
tions within a committee, or outside lobbyists. The natu-
ral question that arises in suchamodel iswhether themul-
tiple actors who can engage in policy development will
free-ride on each other’s efforts or engage in an arms race
to produce high-valence policies at different ideological
locations. Second, as suggestedbyour colleague JohnHat-
field, themodel could be extended to allow a committee to
choose whether to invest in transferable or policy-specific
expertise. This variant would capture the intuition that a
committee’s decision to collect general or policy-specific
information is affected by strategic considerations of pol-
icy influence. In particular, the ability to use policy-
specific information to exert informal agenda power may
inefficiently distort a committee’s informational invest-
ments in this direction. Third, themodel could be used to
analyze how other features of legislative institutions, such
as the filibuster, affect the quality of policies that are en-
acted. Ultimately, we hope that others will build upon our
model to analyze other aspects of legislative organization
and political processes more generally.
Appendix
Let Vtcl(q, xc), V
t
o(xc), V
nt
cl (q, xc), and V
nt
o (xc) denote
the floor’s equilibrium utility when the commit-
tee invests—subscripts refer to the rule (closed or
open) and superscripts refer to the type of valence
(transferable or nontransferable). Now define the
function V (q, x) as follows. For x ∈ [0, q],V(q , x) =
E [v] −  f (x).Forx ∈ (q ,∞),V(q , x) =
∫ v¯(x ;q)
0 − f
(q) f (v)dv + ∫∞
v¯(x ;q)
(
v −  f (x)
)
f (v) dv.
Lemma 3. V (q, x) has the following properties.
(i)The floor’s equilibrium utility if the committee
invests can be expressed in terms of V(·), be-
cause V tcl(q, xc) = V (q, xc),Vto(xc) = V (0,
0) = E[v],Vntcl (q , xc ) = V(q , x˜ cl (xc , q)), and
Vnto (q , xc ) = V(0, x˜ cl (xc , 0)).
(ii)V (q, x) is continuous in q and xc .
(iii)V (q, x) is strictly decreasing in x and limx→∞
V (q, x) = −f (q).
(iv)V (q, x) is strictly decreasing in q for q ∈ [0, x].
Proof . Property 1 is straightforward to verify and 2
follows from continuity of f (·) and c(·).
Property 3: First we show strictly decreasing. Clearly
the property holds for x ≤ q. Now consider q < x < x′,
which implies v¯ (x ; q) < v¯ (x ′; q). Then we have
V (q , x) =
∫ v¯(x ;q)
0
− f (q) f (v) dv
+
∫ v¯(x ′;q)
v¯(x ;q)
(v −  f (x)) f (v)dv
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x ′;q)
(v −  f (x)) f (v) dv
and
V (q , x ′) =
∫ v¯(x ;q)
0
− f (q) f (v) dv
+
∫ v¯(x ′;q)
v¯(x ;q)
− f (q) f (v)dv
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x ′;q)
(v −  f (x ′)) f (v)dv,
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which implies
V (q ,x) − V (q ,x ′)
=
∫ v¯(x ′;q)
v¯(x ;q)
((v −  f (x)) − (− f (q))) f (v)dv
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x ′;q)
( f (x
′) −  f (x)) f (v)dv > 0.
In the first term v −f (x)≥−f (q) because v ≥ v¯ (x ; q).
In the second term f (x′) > f (x) because x′ > x.
Now we show limx→∞V (q, x) = −f (q). Clearly
limx→∞V (q, x) ≥ −f (q) since V (q, x) > −f (q)∀x.
It hence suffices to show limx→∞V (q, x)≤ −f (q). Since
−f (x) < 0, we have
limx→∞ V (q , x) ≤ limx→∞
(∫ v¯(x ;q)
0
− f (q) f (v) dv
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x ;q)
v f (v) dv
)
= lim
z→∞
(∫ z
0
− f (q) f (v) dv
+
∫ ∞
z
v f (v) dv
)
by v¯ (x ; q)
increasing, convex in x
= − f (q) .
Property 4: Consider q < q′ < x, which implies
v¯ (x ; q ′) < v¯ (x ; q). Then
V (q , x) − V (q ′, x)
=
∫ v¯(x ;q ′)
0
(
 f
(
q ′
)−  f (q)) f (v) dv
+
∫ v¯(x ;q)
v¯(x ;q ′)
(− f (q) − (v −  f (x))) f (v) dv > 0
since f (q′) > f (q) and −f (q) > v − f (x) for v <
v¯ (x ; q). 
Proof of Lemma 1. From equation (5), the commit-
tee’s optimal choice satisfies
x˜ cl (xc , q) = argmax
x∈[q ,xc ]
{
− F (v¯ (x ; q))c (xc − q)
− (1 − F (v¯ (x ; q)))c (xc − x)
+
∫ ∞
v¯(x ;q)
v f (v) dv
}
.
Recall v¯ (x ; q) =  f (x) −  f (q). The derivative of the
committee’s objective function w.r.t. x is
(1 − F (v¯ (x ; q))) (− H (v¯ (x ; q)) · ′f (x)
· [c (xc − q) − c (xc − x) + v¯ (x ; q)]
+ ′c (xc − x)
)
,
(9)
where H(v) denotes the hazard rate f (v)1−F (v) and
∂v¯
∂x =
′f (x). To show that the committee’s optimal target pol-
icy is unique, strictly interior to [q, xc], and characterized
by the first-order condition, it suffices to show that equa-
tion (9) (a) is strictly positive evaluated at x = q, (b) is
strictly negative evaluated at x = xc , and (c) crosses 0
exactly once.
First, note that equation (9) is the product of two
terms, (1 − F (v¯ (x ; q))) and Z(x, q, xc), where
Z(x, q , xc ) ≡ −H (v¯ (x ; q)) · ′f (x)
· [c (xc − q) − c (xc − x) + v¯ (x ; q)]
+ ′c (xc − x) . (10)
Since (1 − F (v¯ (x ; q))) > 0, ∀x by full support of f (v),
equation (9) has the same sign as Z(x, q, xc), so it suffices
to show properties (a), (b), and (c) for the latter.
To show (a), evaluating at x = q,Z(q, q, xc)= ′c(xc −
q)> 0. To show (b), evaluating at x= xc and using the fact
that i (0) = ′i (0) = 0, Z(xc , q , xc ) = −H (v¯ (xc ; q)) ·
′f (xc ) · [c (xc − q) + v¯ (xc ; q)] < 0.
To show (c) we show Z(x, q, xc) is strictly decreas-
ing in x. Examining equation (10) term by term, it is
straightforward to verify that the following observations
imply this property: (1) v¯ (x ; q) is strictly increasing in x
and hence, because H(v) is assumed to be nondecreas-
ing, H (v¯ (x ; q)) is nondecreasing in x, (2)−c(xc − x) is
strictly increasing in x, (3) ′f (x) is strictly increasing in x
by convexity, and (4) ′c(xc − x) is strictly decreasing in
x.
Finally, we show that x˜ cl (xc , q) is strictly increas-
ing in q. First, observe that by the properties previ-
ously shown, Z(x, q, xc) > 0 implies that x˜ cl (xc , q) > x .
Thus, if we let q < q′ we can show that the target pol-
icy is strictly increasing, i.e., x˜ cl (xc , q ′) > x˜ cl (xc , q) ,
by proving that Z(x˜ cl (xc , q) , q , xc ) = 0 implies that
Z(x˜ cl (xc , q) , q ′, xc ) > 0. This holds because Z(x, q, xc)
is strictly increasing in q, which can be seen from equa-
tion (10) due to the fact that (1) v¯ (x ; q) is strictly decreas-
ing in q, which implies H (v¯ (x ; q)) is weakly decreasing
in q, and (2) c(xc − q) is strictly decreasing in q. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The initial choice of rule has no
effect on the set of possible target policies, the expected
distribution of postinvestment valence returns, or the set
82 ALEXANDER V. HIRSCH AND KENNETHW. SHOTTS
of feasible postinvestment bill referrals. Hence, it suffices
to show that every postinvestment bill referral by the
committee will result in the same final policy outcome
when the floor behaves optimally in the final stage. This
implies that the ex ante expected floor and committee
payoffs for any investment decision and choice of target
policy will be identical between the two subgames.
Consider an arbitrary bill referral (vˆ, xˆ) . Under a
closed rule with a status quo point (0, 0), the floor’s
choice set is restricted to {(0, 0) , (vˆ, xˆ)}, where (vˆ, xˆ)
is the committee’s bill referral and may be different
from the target policy with realized valence (v˜, x˜). Un-
der an open rule, the floor may select from the full set
{(0, y) , ∀y ∈ R} ∪ {(vˆ, xˆ)}. However, the floor’s addi-
tional choices are irrelevant because (0, 0) dominates any
(0, y). Hence for any bill referral (vˆ, xˆ), the floor’s final
stage choice in either game is identical, demonstrating the
result. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first the closed
rule. Associated with x˜ cl (xc , q) is a valence cutpoint
v¯(x˜ cl (xc , q); q) such that x˜ cl (xc , q) prevails over the sta-
tus quo whenever v˜ ≥ v¯(x˜ cl (xc , q); q). Now let y be the
unique ideological location in the interval (0, xc) that sat-
isfies v¯(x˜ cl (xc , q); q) = v¯(y; 0). Recall v¯(y; 0) is the va-
lence cutoff under an open rule when the target policy is y
(by Lemma 2). Henceforth, we denote v¯(y; 0) as v¯(y) for
simplicity. So y is the ideological point between the floor
and committee ideal points such that, were the committee
to select it as the target policy under an open rule, it would
become the final policy outcome for the same realizations
of valence as x˜ cl (xc , q) does under a closed rule. It is easy
to verify that y exists, is unique, and is in the interval
(0, xc).
Now suppose that under an open rule the committee
invests and works on target policy y. The utility from
working on y must be weakly less than the utility of
working on x˜o(xc ) (because the latter is optimal), and
combining this observation with equation (8), we have
cnto (xc ) ≥ (1 − F (v¯ (y))) [c (xc ) − c (xc − y)]
+
∫ ∞
v¯(y)
v f (v) dv.
Now subtract cntcl (xc , q) in equation (6) from both sides,
recalling that v¯
(
x˜ cl (xc , q) ; q
) = v¯ (y).
cnto (xc ) − cntcl (xc , q) ≥ (1 − F (v¯ (y))) ([c (xc )
− c (xc − y)] − [c (xc − q)
− c
(
xc − x˜ cl (xc , q)
)
]
)
.
Because f (·) has full support (1 − F (v¯ (y))) is strictly
positive, so a sufficient condition for cnto (xc) > c
nt
cl (xc , q)
is
c (xc ) − c (xc − y) > c (xc − q)
− c
(
xc − x˜ cl (xc , q)
)
.
(11)
Equation (11) follows from convexity of f (·) and c(·) .
We show this in two steps. First we argue that y >
x˜ cl (xc , q) − q .
 f
(
x˜ cl (xc , q)
) −  f (q) = v¯ (x˜ (xc , q) ; q) = v¯ (y)
=  f (y) <  f (y + q) −  f (q) .
(12)
The last inequality follows from convexity of f (·)
and f (0) = 0. Equation (12) shows  f
(
x˜ cl (xc , q)
)
<
 f (y + q), implying y + q > x˜ cl (xc , q) since f (·) is
strictly increasing. We now use the fact that y >
x˜ cl (xc , q) − q to show the final result.
c (xc ) − c (xc − y)
> c (xc − q) − c (xc − (y + q))
> c (xc − q) − c
(
xc − x˜ cl (xc , q)
)
.
The strict inequality in the first line follows fromconvexity
of c(·). The strict inequality at the start of the second line
follows from the fact that y + q > x˜ cl (xc , q) and c(·) is
increasing. 
Proof of Proposition 4. If c > cnto (xc), the committee
does not invest in valence under either rule, and the floor
prefers an open rule. If c ∈ (cntcl (xc , q), cnto (xc)], the com-
mittee invests only under an open rule. Under a closed
rule the floor’s utility is −f (q) < 0. Under an open rule,
the floor’s utility is at least as great as 0 − f (0) = 0 for
any v˜, so it strictly prefers an open rule.
Finally, consider c ≤ cntcl (xc , q), which implies the
committee invests in valence under both rules. We must
show that Vntcl (q, xc) < V
nt
o (xc).
Vntcl (q , xc ) = V
(
q , x˜ cl (xc , q)
)
< V
(
0, x˜ cl (xc , q)
)
by parts 1 and 4 of Lemma 3
< V
(
0, x˜ cl (xc , 0)
) = Vnto (xc )
by Lemma 1, and parts 1 and 3 of Lemma 3. 
References
Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. 1997. “Formal and Real Au-
thority in Organizations.” The Journal of Political Economy
105(1): 1–29.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and JamesM. Snyder Jr. 2000. “Valence
Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models.” Public
Choice 103(3/4): 327–36.
Aragones, Enriqueta, and Thomas Palfrey. 2002. “Mixed Equi-
librium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate.”
Journal of Economic Theory 103(1): 131–61.
POLICY-SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND INFORMAL AGENDA POWER 83
Ashworth, Scott, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2009. “Elec-
tions with Platform and Valence Competition.” Games and
Economic Behavior 67(1): 191–216.
Austen-Smith, David. 1990. “Information Transmission in De-
bate.” American Journal of Political Science 34(1): 124–52.
Baron, David P. 2000. “Legislative Organization with Infor-
mational Committees.” American Journal of Political Science
44(3): 485–505.
Battaglini, Marco. 2002. “Multiple Referrals and Multidimen-
sional Cheap Talk.” Econometrica 70: 1379–1401.
Bendor, Jonathan, and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. “Spatial Mod-
els of Delegation.” American Political Science Review 98(2):
293–310.
Caillaud, Bernard, and Jean Tirole. 2002. “Parties as Politi-
cal Intermediaries.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4):
1453–89.
Callander, Steven. 2008. “A Theory of Policy Expertise.” Quar-
terly Journal of Political Science 3(2): 123–40.
Crawford, Vince, and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information
Transmission.” Econometrica 50: 1431–51.
Diermeier, Daniel. 1995. “Commitment, Deference, and Leg-
islative Institutions.” American Political Science Review
89(2): 344–55.
Fenno, Richard F. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston:
Little, Brown.
Gilligan, ThomasW., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “Collective De-
cisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational
Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures.” Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(2): 287–335.
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. “Organization
of InformativeCommittees by aRational Legislature.”Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 34(2): 531–64.
Groseclose, Tim. 2001. “A Model of Candidate Location When
One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage.”American Journal
of Political Science 45(4): 862–86.
Hall, Richard. 1996. Participation in Congress. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Hall, Richard L., and Bernard Grofman. 1990. “The Committee
Assignment Process and theConditionalNature ofCommit-
tee Bias.” American Political Science Review 84(4): 1149–66.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 2005. “Plausibility of Signals by a Heteroge-
neous Committee.” American Political Science Review 95(2):
453–57.
Krishna, Vijay, and JohnMorgan. 2005. “Asymmetric Informa-
tion and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments.” American
Political Science Review 95(2): 435–52.
Lax, Jeffrey R., andCharlesM. Cameron. 2007. “Bargaining and
Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court.” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 23(2): 276–302.
Londregan, John B. 2000. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in
Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Londregan, John, and James M. Snyder Jr. 1994. “Comparing
Committee and Floor Preferences.” Legislative Studies Quar-
terly 19(2): 233–266.
Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1979. “Bureaucrats
versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Alloca-
tion by Direct Democracy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
93(4): 563–587.
Ting, Michael M. 2011. “Organizational Capacity.” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization. Forthcoming.
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the
online version of this article:
• Section 1 proves main substantive results hold if the
valence of the status quo is strictly greater than zero.
• Section 2 provides a complete set of results for the
committee composition game (these results are used
to generate the example in the main text).
• Section 3 analyzes a variant of our model in which
valence is transferable by the committee but not ex-
propriable by the floor.
Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the
content or functionality of any supporting materials sup-
plied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing
material) should be directed to the corresponding author
for the article.
